in article 0Fdsb.49581$Ec1.3303474 at bgtnsc05-news.ops.worldnet.att.net, KP_PC
at k.p.collins at worldnet.att.net wrote on 11/11/03 2:46 PM:
> "Michael Olea" <oleaj at sbcglobal.net> wrote in message
> news:BBD69100.12C8%oleaj at sbcglobal.net...> | in article lnd2rv0k34b2sp117g8sbjl5mtu5e6acci at 4ax.com, r norman at
> | rsn_ at _comcast.net wrote on 11/11/03 11:27 AM:
> |
> | > On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 19:14:13 GMT, "Dio" <dadaismo at tin.it> wrote:
> | >
> | >> [...]
> | > That is, the brain IS a kind of machine
> | > already, so yes, consciousness can
> | > be produced by a machine. And that
> | > means that is could also be produced
> | > by a non-biological machine.
> | >
> | The last sentence does not necessarily
> | follow - it is a logical possibility that
> | whatever it is that makes a machine
> | "non-biological" also makes it
> | incapable of consciousness. I am not
> | advocating that position, just
> | pointing out a flaw in the reasoning.
>> One has to take the last two sentences of
> R. Norman's post as a unit. The 2nd-to-last
> sentence implies "biological machine".
>> ken
>>
Right. And the last sentence concludes that because there are "biological
machines" capable of consciousness there must be "non-biological machines"
also capable of consciousness. This does not follow. One way to see that
is to draw a Venn diagram.
