On 28 Dec 2003 12:18:51 -0800, keith wrote:
>> But no matter what, if "god exists" is the conclusion of some premise P, then
>> the truth of "god exists" is contingent on the truth of P.
>>That's not true AFAICS. If P were false that would not make "God
>exists" false.
It wouldn't make ut true, either. The proposition would be logically
indeterminate. I'll rephrase the above statement as follows:
Given a valid argument whose conclusion is "god exists", then "god's exists"
is true if and only if the premise of the argument is true. Otherwise, "god
exists" is logically indeterminate.
> And it still doesn't make God *existence* dependent on
>P. It could be the case that the statement "OJ Simpson is guilty of
>murderer" is seen to be true because of the incredible evidence
>against him, but that doesn't mean his *guilt* depends on that
>evidence. At most it would be our knowledge of his guilt that is
>dependent on the evidence.
Knowledge isn't the issue - arguments purporting to prove "god exists" is
true are the issue. Logically, such arguments make the truth of the
conclusion contingent on the truth of the premise. It's irrelevant what one
may or may not know about god's existence. For that matter, the arguer's
beliefs about the truth of "god exists" are also irrelevant. For that matter,
god's existence isn't the issue, either -- it's purported proofs of god's
existence that are the issue.
--
Wolf Kirchmeir, Blind River ON Canada
"Nature does not deal in rewards or punishments, but only in consequences."
(Robert Ingersoll)