Nervous systems work, simultaneously, on g'zillions of problems.
The one-thing-at-a-'time'-ness that's externally-observable occurs =only= as
a function of the worth inherent in there being a well-delineated behavioral
dynamic if a system is to perform useful work within the environment in
which it exists During the course of 'normal' system-environment interactive
dynamics, system-environment interaction would be a relatively-random
'jumble', which would tend not to exert sufficient power with respect to any
environmental particular, within environmentally-imposed 'time' constraints,
which is Crucial with respect to 'aggressive' interactive dynamics. [Which
is 'where' evolution happened.] [The behavior of folks who transgress this
'rule' is termed "insane" by casual observers. Sometimes, there's correlated
organic damage in-there. More-often the correlated 'jumble' is only the
result of an individual venturing into realms with respect to which shared,
economical interactive dynamics have not yet been agreed-upon. Most-often
it's 'just' the relative unfamiliarity of what appears, to the casual
observers, to be a 'jumble'. They do not share the correlated behaviroal
'dictionary' [information-base]].]
It's only be-cause of the inter-system interaction problem that what's
actually g'zillion-faceted seems, when externally observed, to be a
one-at-a-'time' thing.
This is why, for instance, it's Dangerous to use a cell phone while driving.
The act of inter-system communication, inherent, invokes the
one-thing-at-a-'time' [super]system configuration, lest explicit meaning
[communicative power] be lost in a word 'jumble' that, nevertheless,
correlates to the larger ongoing internal information-processing dynamics.
[Folks who monitored a long-former post of mine, please note: this is a
CLARIFICATION of what I discussed in that post.]
Sans ongoing inter-system interaction, there's no such constraint, and our
nervous systems are working on huge numbers of problems, all simultaneously.
Nervous systems can do such because they 'translate' all information into an
abstract 'language' that maps =directionalities= within an internal frame of
reference [IFR] that's, more or less, rigorously-coupled with respect to the
external experiential environment.
'Translating' everything into 'directionalities' works because what the host
organisms [i. e. Humans, etc.] do is move within their experiential external
environments. Movement is just orchestrated-directedness, so 'translating'
everything into directionalities permits the parameters of any problem
simultaneously 'blend' with the parameters of every other problem that's
being, simultaneously, worked on. [This's also why 'verbs' exist,
universally, within 'language'. 'Verbs' map the directionalities inherent in
motion, simultaneously, aligning 'language' within the IFR.]
The information-processing power, inherent, is Awesome. {As I've discussed
in the past, in comp.ai, and have recently discussed again, in
bionet.neuroscience ["glia" posts [to which I'll return, later, with info
relevant to 'AI' folks]], I've been able to discover no 'boundaries' to it.]
As nervous systems perform information-processing Work, 'solutions' to all
defined-in-experience information-processing problems are distributed along
a continuum between 'moving-toward' and 'moving away from' extrema.
Conveniently binary, but with continua directionalities and continua
'gradations' of movement-power.
In the 'ideal' case, the IFR is a 3-D solid that's mapped 4-D within nervous
systems.
[If anyone 'wonders', the larger problem whose Resolution I'm working to
communicate derives in the fact that what's defined-in-experience for one
nervous system is not necessarily defined-in-experience for other nervous
systems, with the result being that folks, literally, resort to Savagery
with respect to their 'favorite' [familiar] directionalities [which are just
TD E/I within IFRs]. I'm working to remove the absence of understanding with
respect to such, in terms of integrated nervous system function. It's Tragic
Ignorance with respect to which folks still tend to "ho-hum" without
understanding what needs to be understood.]
Thanks for the Opportunity to discuss this stuff, Scott.
Cheers, ken [k. p. colins]
Scott Powell wrote in message ...
>On Sun, 14 Jul 2002 11:53:58 -0700, Laurent wrote:
>>> On Sat, 13 Jul 2002 20:05:48 GMT, Scott Powell <teraten at descil.cjb.net>
>> wrote:
>>> Why is a human mind, purportedly a massively parallel neural network,
>>> only capable of focusing on one thing (or a very finite number of
>>> things) at a time?
>>>>>> This is something that's been bothering me for quite some time.. if you
>>> know another newsgroup that might be a better place for this question,
>>> please let me know.
>>>>>> I just wanted to add a piece of my mind : it seems to me that what is
>> done subconscientiously looks like recursive actions, like walking while
>> whisseling (very well- known actions). Couldn't that mean that the brain
>> starts those actions as self-running threads and stops them when
>> something "unusual" appends (like activations of emotions) ?
>>>> I mean : those actions are so well-known that it doesn't need any
>> thinking to run.
>>>> Is there any counter-example ?
>>>> Laurent.
>>Pattern oscillators in the muscles themselves, perhaps.
>But it is interesting to note that... let me demonstrate.
>>Think about breathing. Draw in a breath. Let it out. Now don't breathe
>while you read these next couple of sentences. Try to start the pattern
>oscillating in your lungs again, without thinking. Can you do it? Go
>ahead, try..
>>I'm curious. I can't do it. I have to maintain muscle control over my
>lungs, consciously considering each intake of breath, each compression
>and expansion of my lungs. But as soon as I think of something else, my
>breathing continues, as if it had never been an unconscious behavior.
>>So what's going on?
>>(I left this post here, but I suggest we move the topic to
>bionet.neuroscience, since in content if not origin, it belongs there,
>more - agree?)
>>Scott Powell
>without thinking about something else.