This message is a combined version of the my statements in preceding
discussions; it is intended as a conclusion of my request for comment. I
will address it as well to other bionet newsgroups. Many thanks for the
responses obtained sofar.
I would like to receive comments on the recent results of a multi-year
research effort, aimed at
modelling the human brain, seen as an information handling system. Below I
will sketch an outline of
it.
Summary
The strategy of that research project has been formulated as follows:
* 'Modelling the information system 'Man' by modelling its evolutionary
emergence'.
This strategy was deemed to be necessary as the system 'Man' has become such
complex, because of
its long evolutionary history and of its 'trial & error' emergence
procedure, that any modelling of that
'Information System Man' can only be done in an effective way if the
evolution of that information
system is considered at the same time. As a consequence, the modelling
procedure involved not only
the information system 'Man' but also the evolutionary process that created
successive life forms. My
modelling involves therefore both the evolution of the information system
and the end result, the
information system of Homo sapiens sapiens.
It has resulted in a (admittedly ambitious) research project, which aim is
to define a modelling for the
information handling aspects of the system 'Man', in which all aspects of
human behaviour are
considered, comprising emotional-, irrational- and rational/cognitive
behaviour patterns, in both
awake- and dream states, for individual and social behaviour. It is stated
that this, one, information
system 'Man' handles all human activities. The involved modelling comprises:
not only the functional aspects, Man's mind, i.e. how that system
observes, and reacts to, the
environment and how it builds up, and uses via recalls, an internal
database from these
observations and from genetically transferred preferences for such
behaviour, but also:
how the involved information items are stored and transferred in Man's
brain structure; the
transfer taking place, in general, from the sensory input towards the
motor output.
Historical Overview
In the initial years of our research effort, it became clear that a
completely different approach, than is
usually followed, is necessary to solve the involved modelling problems. I
may illustrate this by the
following statements of respected authors:
Patricia Churchland (1988)stated in her book Neurophilosophy':
our present day knowledge of the functioning of the human brain and mind
demonstrates clearly
the lack of some unifying theory for the information handling processes in
the human brain and
mind.'
A similar statement, be it within another context, was made already in the
1930's by Vygotsky
(1934/1986):
The atomistic and functional modes of analyses prevalent during the past
decade (1934) treated
psychic processes in isolation. Methods of research were developed and
perfected with a view to
studying separate functions, while their interdependence and their
organization in the structure of
consciousness as a whole remained outside the field of investigation.'
There are so many psychologies precisely because there is no one
psychology'.
These very early remarks are still valid according to me.
Such a theory for 'neuro informatics' has to complement the already
extensive knowledge that has
been built up in the fields of:
the topographical structure of the brain according to the distribution of
functional centres;
the detailed communication processes on neuron level and
the psychological aspects of human behaviour.
Somewhat exaggerated, one could state that nearly all research effort has
been spent sofar on trying
to understand the information handling processes in the human brain/mind by
studying on a very
detailed level the physical carrier (the brain) of these processes and by
studying outside human
behaviour. The equivalent in computer science would be by trying to
understand the functionality of
an application program by studying the bitstreams through the communication
channels of a
computer system and by inspecting the printed output. It is evident that in
both cases a higher/ more
global (information) viewpoint of an abstract nature is primarily required
in order to really
understand the overall concept of such a system.
We may further state that evolution is a tinkerer, not an engineer;
phylogenesis acts on what is there,
not on what the optimal design of a new life form should be. We may (justly)
admire the brain's
functionality but from an information handling design' point of view, one
can raise many question
marks on its logical structure. Freud identified this design error' by an
internal conflict' in the
human brain. Two other indications of this troublesome information system
design' are to be found
in the following literature references:
Lawrence (1992; page 38), in which the detailed genetic development
procedure in the creation
of a fruitfly from a fertilized egg is presented. The shaping information
is derived from
concentration gradients in the egg and larva of certain proteins that are
being produced at the
instruction of certain genes. At specific concentration levels other genes
are activated etc.,
leading to different developments in the various body parts. At some
development stage a
previously activated gene is being blocked by the later activation of
another gene that directs the
further development in another direction. The following statement in that
publication is worth
noting in the present context:
'It seems perverse that the fly should have a specific genetic system
to clear up the unwanted
expression of another gene. Would it not be simpler to switch of
hunchback [i.e. the
troublesome gene!] in the mother? This result illustrates a general
principle and delivers a
chastening lesson; the principle is that evolution works on what is
there [emphasis by author],
it tinkers, it does not look at the whole system and devise a logical
or economical solution.'
A similar statement is to be found in Litman (1996), in which the
evolutionary development of
the immune system is traced over a period of hundreds of millions of
years. It appears that there
also the development has not been 'aimed' at some specific goal but
appears to wander. Litman
states:
'The idiosyncratic nature of this ancient immune system illustrates
well the twists and turns
that occurred during the evolution of immunity. This sinuous course,
moreover, suggests that
evolution, at least where the immune system is concerned, may not have
always proceeded in
the inexorable, successive way in which it is often portrayed'.
These design problems lead, unavoidably, to a modelling nightmare' if you
concentrate only on the
status quo', i.e. the present characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens. We
came therefore to the
conclusion that we have to model primarily the evolutionary procedure,
starting from initial multi-cell
life forms, some 700 million years ago, with, initially, only some broad,
global, information handling
concept.
In order to judge whether such a more global modelling definition could be
possible, at least in
principle, via some packaging' of an extensive set of highly interlinked,
often very detailed,
information handling data, it will be necessary first to:
determine whether this complex system is indeed structured in some
hierarchical way, linking
detailed characteristics, as some subsets, to more global characteristics,
and if yes:
understand how this hierarchical structure has been designed' by
evolution.
Our evolutionary analyses reveal sufficient justifications for the first
question to be answered in an
affirmitive way. One might even conclude from these analyses that evolution
had to be a top-down'
procedure as it could not have resulted otherwise in effective life forms of
gradually increasing
complexity.
Summarizing the various observations from the evolutionary analyses, we
could state in this respect
that:
there exists at least some justification for our postulate that the DNA
'life form design repository'
is built up gradually during evolution in phylogenesis and is 'unravelled'
gradually and top-down
during ontogenesis.
ontogenesis and phylogenesis are therefore indeed both determined by the
(same) DNA design
classification but still may differ because of the following facts:
in phylogenesis the DNA classification is being built up in time; new
additions to the design
classification may block or modify certain characteristics of the
'older' design instructions,
in ontogenesis all evolutionary developments are in principle active.
However, their activation
during ontogenesis need not take place in the same order, or not
completely, as was the case
during phylogenesis, as the execution activation is a network procedure
within the design
classification, that may connect a 'distant-', and therefore/possibly
an evolutionarily more
recent', design classification as the next follow up instruction,
forgetting' or blocking'
some of the older design instructions.
The modelling leads therefore to the conclusion that Haeckel's, famous but
generally rejected,
recapitulation law' is:
indeed at fault, if applied to the complete physical ontogenesis
procedure, but is:
in principle correct as far as the DNA design classification is concerned.
However the execution
of that design during ontogenesis hides' that recapitulation aspect.
Points of view and results of analyses in literature on this recapitulation
issue, as expressed e.g. in
Ridley (1996), are in agreement, or at least not in contradiction, with the
above observations.
In defining that design classification we followed the following analysis:
1 Evolution is not entirely chaotic. There is an ordering principle involved
as well, namely the
selection criterion Survival of the Fittest'
2 A major modelling problem is therefore: What is the result of this
ordering principle for the
build-up procedure for the life form design', as it will become stored in
DNA?
3 This, very important, aspect was discussed at length in the research
effort. Below I will try to
sketch a very short summary.
4 The test in the (hostile) environment, i.e. the struggle for life, will
determine whether or not any
adaptation is favourable for that survival. This aspect must furnish the
unifying concept that will
transform the results of the successful trials of the tinkering procedure
of evolution into a neat'
information handling architecture.
5 The evolutionary analyses show that the evolutionary tinkerer made, via
the survival test,
successive adaptations in the transformation of sensory observations into
motor acts, leading to
a continuous improvement, at least for successful adaptations, in some
virtual image, created in
the brain, that mirrored' the observed environment and the individual's,
and other's, position
and (intended) actions in that environment. This is the major, in fact the
only, design strategy' of
evolution.
6 This gradually improved mirroring' of outside reality in some
representation/image in the brain is
an absolute necessity for coping in a favourable way with any challenge
that the environment may
pose to the individual. It is therefore no wonder that evolution's trial
and error' resulted in such
a virtual image representation.
7 This virtual image is shown to have evolved, in successive life forms,
from simple, reflex-like,
structures, via separate egocentric- and allocentric images into a
viewpoint independent true
virtual image, that became in Homo sapiens and, later, in Homo sapiens
sapiens further extended
into purely abstract representations, that have lost any direct
relationship with material outside
reality, but nevertheless were extremely important for survival via tool
use conceptions, planning,
foresight, recalls from expanding know-how- and experience databases, etc.
8 The successfullness of these adaptations is judged by the primary
selection criterion in evolution:
'Does the modification/extension result in less fertile offspring?'
If yes, the modification will disappear; otherwise it will remain and
contribute to the multiple
variations in life forms, and if successful, will become even dominant. It
results in the
evolutionary arbitration strategy that:
a gives, in general, preference to social instinct norms above individual
instincts (care for the
individual), at least within the individual's social group (take
primarily care of the weaker
members of the social group, such as children, older and handicapped),
and:
b avoids, if possible, unnecessary deadly (dangerous) struggle.
This strategy promotes the number of fertile offspring.
9 These observations justify the statement that evolution constructed not
only some hierarchic
structure but applied that structure also to one well-defined information
entity, the virtual image
and the response to the challenge(s) it contained. The struggle for
survival ensured that this
information entity, and the resulting response, retained its well-defined
character as a gradually
improving mirroring' of outside reality and of the individual's, and
other's, position in that
environment.
10 The same struggle for survival ensured that the response to the
challenges, as comprised in the
virtual image, were also favourable for that survival.
11 We found further that this virtual image was gradually built up by
evolution via a strict top-
down' procedure.
The modelling procedure involves therefore the gradual upgrading of the
virtual image in successive
life forms and an analysis, with several, unavoidably somewhat speculative,
assumptions, on the
implementation of that virtual image in the neural structure. We keep away,
as far as possible, from
(sub)cellular levels in order to avoid that we don't see the forest anymore
through the trees';
information handling is the primary issue. However, we should show also how
the link is made
between modelling the virtual image handling and at least the neuronal
information handling.
We came to the conclusion in our research that we can define this link for a
small number of standard
neuronal assemblies from which the whole brain structure is constructed by
evolution.
An important aspect of this link is the following set of modelling
statements:
1 The brain comprises some 1012 neurons.
2 Each neuron is, on average, connected to some 10,000 other neurons, mostly
in the immediate
vicinity.
3 The cortex is organized in columnar entities of 0.75 mm diameter,
containing somewhat more
than 10,000 neurons. The cerebellum is likewise organized in stripes'.
4 The modelling procedure states / assumes / speculates, as the result of a
detailed analysis, that
each columnar entity represents the neural equivalent of a standard
Hopfield network, as studied
and defined in AI. Each Hopfield network comprises n nodal points, each
one connected to all
other ones. This is a structure remarkably similar to the columnar entity.
For cerebellar stripes
similar equivalencies are found.
5 Following the design data as derived in AI for such a BHN (basic Hopfield
network), it is found
that each BHN can store 1400 vectors of 9000 bits each.
6 Together with a found chopping time' of 200 msec., that chops' the
continuous sensory info-
flow into chunks' at these time intervals, this leads to the conclusion /
assumption that in the
primary sensory cortex these BHN memory units function as shift
registers' of the FIFO type
(first in first out), storing a short film' of most recent observations
of environmental events of
some 1400 x 0.2 sec = 5 minutes duration. This information system is
therefore conscious' of
the most recent events, enabling it to pursue a course with a certain
goal, such as chasing a prey,
following a debate, etc.
7 A further analysis leads to the modelling statement that a large number of
these BHN's (the
cortex contains some 150,000 per brain half) is organied in some
hierarchic structure, that store
together the information items of the virtual image.
8 Once you have reached this stage, you can then model the virtual image
handling processes by
referring only to storage- and recall facilities of these BHN's and its
superstructures. One can
forget' then all more detailed information handling at neuronal level in
the same way as a
programmer does; he/she also considers only his programs and files and
does not bother to
consider the much more detailed instructions at processor level or in
read/write operations on
disc.
The evolutionary process is further critically dependent on unpredictable
and largely unknowable
environmental conditions at those early periods of several 100 million years
ago. I formulated this
modelling design problem' as follows:
Man', and in fact every presently living entity is the result of a
chaotic procedure, called
evolution. If we could repeat that procedure, the result (i.e. Homo
sapiens sapiens) might
very well be quite different'.
My statement that modelling of the present brain is only possible by
modelling its evolutionary
emergence is therefore in itself true but should be upgraded' by stating
also that the present
characteristics of Man's brain should be considered as well as aiming
point' in the evolutionary
modelling, in case more than one possible modelling extension presents
itself.
In this aspect of the modelling procedure we make use of the various
available aiming points', as
these can be derived, not only from Homo sapiens sapiens but also from much
older life forms. A
publication like that of Winson, 1990; 'The meaning of dreams'; Scientific
American November 1990
pages 42 through 48; See also: Scientific American, volume 276, special
issue, 1997, pages 58
through 67, has played an important role in this aiming procedure'. We
found that this gradual
neural implementation procedure can also be characterized by a hierarchic
and recursive
development procedure. As a result, the immense complexity of the brain
becomes much easier to
describe and understand. It is (afterwards) no wonder that evolution
concluded that the neural
emergence procedure should be a simple recursive process; seen from a
control viewpoint for this
design information' handling task, it could not have been differently.
Architecture of the Brain
In defining the modelling environment we conclude that:
1 The brain's network can be discriminated into:
a a consciously operating, maze structured, feed forward / backward
network, that operates
more or less as an ethernet type LAN (local area network) with probably
some simpler
equivalent of ethernet's csma-cd transfer protocol,
b an unconsciously operating network of highly interlinked, Hopfield
type, memory storage
units, that lead to extensive abstracting-(bird>wing>feather>etc) and
prototyping (dove +
eagle > bird etc) relationships.
2 The cooperation between these two, interconnected, network structures
models (we think
correctly) the two learning environments, as defined by McClelland
(1987/1994/1995) as:
a focussed learning', a fast but simple storage procedure,
b interleaved learning' a 10 times slower but much more advanced
learning procedure, that
creates the above mentioned information network of abstracting- and
prototyping
relationships.
3 An important role is stated to be fulfilled by the hippocampal region. Our
modelling presents a
possible implementation for Edelman's phasic re-entry'- procedure in the
cortex, that creates the
recursive abstracting- and prototyping procedures. The hippocampal region
controls this proces
in both awake and asleep states; it leads to two types of memory storages:
a one representing the storage of life experiences. It models the
phenomenon of remembering;
one not only knows the facts but also when, where, how and why this
knowledge was
acquired. The storage location is probably in the lower temporal lobe;
Wilder Penfield
demonstrated this already in many experiments in the 1940's (Penfield,
1959),
b one representing the storage of know-how. It models the phenomenon of
knowing; one
knows the fact but not when, where, why and how it was acquired.
The storage location is probably in the prefrontal cortex.
The resulting modelling can be seen as the additional info, that is at
present lacking in the genome
project. After all, the genome project has discovered the existence of a
very big book, written in 3
character words (the triplets), each built up from only four different
characters (A, C, T, G) and
written in a language we do not know. It is a very difficult version of the
Rosetta Stone
Problem'. The resulting modelling can be seen as a first step in unravelling
the language problem
for that Rosetta Stone.
Available Documentation
For those of you who are willing / interested to go into more detail in
making comments, I have
prepared therefore the following files, that I will send as attached files
to interested respondents;
just send me an email:
1 Syscomm04bionet19.2.wpd. It is a WordPerfect7 file of the first six
chapters of Biography of
Man', which is mentioned in my website as the integrated summary of the
modelling
procedure. It refers for many details to a serie of underlying documents,
namely parts I
through VI, VIII through X in the series The Information System Man'. It
comprises the
heart' of the modelling environment; the other chapters discuss
consequences of the
modelling environment for a number of subject areas, such as: language
(still rudimentary),
psychology, psychiatry, politics, crime, law and AI. I must stress however
that these
applications to the functionality of the present case of Homo sapiens
sapiens has functioned
also as inspiration for the evolutionary analyses. We mentioned above that
my statement, that
modelling of the present brain is only possible by modelling its
evolutionary emergence, is in
itself true but should be upgraded' by stating also that the present
characteristics of Man's
brain should be considered as well as aiming point' in the evolutionary
modelling, in case
more than one possible modelling extension presents itself. As a result
the various parts I
through XI of the series The information system Man' were compiled
largely in parallel. The
additional chapters and the various underlying parts I through XI comprise
therefore also
(often more detailed) modelling information. However the abovementioned
file comprises
already some 450 pages text; one has to limit oneself to digestable
consumption' efforts!
2 BLOSBFIGGRAF.wpd It comprises the newer figures to which the text of
Biography of Man'
refers. It is an MSWord97 file
3 BLOSBFIG.tot It comprises the majority (some 90) figures and illustrations
for Biography of
Man'. As this research project started some 15 years ago, it is in an
older (16 bits) version
(5.1) of WordPerfect, that can not be converted to a newer version. If
someone has trouble in
printing this file, let him send me an email with his postal address; I
will send him/her a printed
copy.
4 BLOSBLiterature.doc. It is an MSWord7 file of all literature references.
5 BLOSBTerminology.doc. It is also an MSWord7 file; it comprises the
terminology as used in
the modelling definition. It mentions definitions for notions that have in
daily use often a less
sharply defined meaning. An example is e.g. the notion consciousness',
which is often
heatedly debated without any definition; it results often in endless and
(according to me)
senseless discussions. In my terminology it has a very well defined
meaning as a specific
characteristic of an information handling system.
Specific Questions
The aim of the modelling procedure is to define a model for the real life
entity Man', seen as an
information handling system, that is reasonably isomorph with the
characteristics of that real life
entity.
My own opinion about the result of this modelling effort is that it would be
a miracle if more than
50% of the modelling statements were later found to be 100% true; for the
remaining 50% of the
modelling statements I expect that some need for modification, update or
even reject is quite
possible as a result of confrontation with other knowledge carriers'.
I wellcome of course any critical comment; I hope the scientific community
will say:
At long last we have an (nearly) all embracing theory for the functioning
of the human CNS
(brain + spinal cord). Let us tear it to pieces' in order to see: Where
is it correct, where is it
wrong and where has it to be upgraded/modified etc.'
>From my point of view I am especially interested in critical comments on the
following modelling
issues:
* Can the experimental results of Singer (1995) for the neocortex, of Winson
(1990) and Isaacson
et al (1975) for the hippocampus and of Usrey (1999) and Pauluis (2001) for
other brain entities
as thalamus and basal ganglia indeed be interpreted as justification for the
modelling statement
that (a group of at maximum 8) sensory observations is/are transferred
blockwise over the brain's
feed forward / backward network in 200 msec intervals, each separate sensory
observation taking
some 25 msec within the 'block' of 200 msec?
* Can it indeed be inferred from the analyses in Biography of Man' on the
emergence of single-
and multicell life forms in evolution that this transfer procedure could be
a simplified version of
the ethernet cs-ma-cd protocol?
* Can the statements by Miall et al (1996) and by Whiting (1984) indeed be
interpreted to mean
that the activity urge component of the awareness item, as recalled by the
brain from memory, is
specified as the intended, future, goal to be attained and not as a specific
action?
* Can the experimental results of Cools et al. (1981&1984) and others indeed
be interpreted, as
done in section 5/4/0 of Walle (2000-1), to mean that arbitration /
mediation between some
awareness items with conflicting output urges takes place in the form of an
if . . , then . . , else .
.statement with and/or additions, that unifies these separate, and possibly
conflicting, awareness
items into one more global statement, transferred in parallel as a 200 msec
information block, in
which the original awareness items function as arguments in that if . . ,
then . . , else . .statement?
* Is it indeed justified to model the brain's memory storage procedure via:
* A first short term (days to weeks) storage of all, complete, awareness
items in one segment of
the hippocampus,
* A transformation of this short term storage during REM sleep into a
condensed storage of most
important items in another segment of the hippocampus with a much larger
storage period of
several months,
* A continuous re-insertion, by the hippocampus, of stored awareness items
into the stream of
circulating awareness items, leading to a continuous abstracting and
globalizing / prototyping
procedure, that is used to update the 'information sieve assemblies', in
temporal-, parietal- and
prefrontal cortices, via McClelland's 'interleaved learning'?
* Can it indeed be justified from the evolutionary analyses of Walle
(2000-1) that three separate
mediation / arbitration procedures are active in parallel in the brain; one
centered in the superior
colliculus according to the results of Cools et al (1981&1984), which
constructs an if . . , then . . ,
else . .statement from a number of awareness items, one in the prefrontal
Broca area (indicated as
B4) and the third one in another section of the prefrontal cortex (indicated
as E4)? Is it a
reasonable assumption that the two prefrontally based arbitration centers
construct more global,
prototyped, derivations of the corresponding arguments from conflicting,
parallel, if . . , then . . ,
else . .statements; the resulting lower number of prototyped awareness items
being arbitrated
again in the superior colliculus into one, or a smaller number of, higher
level, if . . , then . . , else .
.statement(s)?
* If the above modelling structures are indeed, more or less, confirmed by
this further analysis,
does this indeed justify the modelling explanation for the phenomenon of
infantile amnesia as
presented in section 7/1/3 in Walle (2000-1)?
* Do the available neuro-anatomic data indeed justify the modelling
postulate that the block
transfer over the feed forward / backward network takes place largely in
parallel, as discussed in
section 6.6 of Walle (2000-1)? Is in these, in parallel operating, transfer
sections the above
mentioned block transfer period of 200 msec then indeed reduced to 25 msec.?
* Does this, in combination with the above mentioned statement on the output
urge representation
as a goal to be achieved, justify the discrimination of the brain's
information handling in:
* A deep structure component in the higher brain regions, handled in
parallel and on the basis of a
goal to be attained and:
* A surface structure component in lower brain regions and especially in
brain stem and spinal
cord, in which:
* Information transfer takes place largely serially and:
* The goal to be attained is translated into a specific series of actions?
* If the previous statement is found to be (predominantly) true; what is the
correct relationship
with the notions deep- and surface structure in language science?
* Does this further analysis indeed justify the various statements in Walle
(2000-1), especially in
sections 5/5/7, 6/5, 6/6 and in chapter 10, on the common deep structure of
very diverse human
activities, such as represented by language-, music- and physical skill
execution?
* Can the above mentioned set of transfer- and manipulation procedures
around sets of awareness
items indeed explain the existence in Man of a universal, genetically
inbred, language acquisition
facility, as proposed by Chomsky (See also Pinker (1997); the language
instinct)? Can the
analyses in section 6/5 of Walle (2000-1) on the gradual integration of
incomplete awareness
items into complete ones be re-interpreted as part of the inbred language
instinct facility, along the
lines as given in section 6/5?
* If the previous statement on the deep- and surface structures is found to
be (predominantly)
true, does this mean that the human lexicon, especially for multi-linguals,
has to be assumed to be
located in the lower brain / CNS entities as brain stem and spinal cord and
not in the cortex? If
yes, does this mean that the 'lexicon' for deep structure awareness item
components in the higher
brain regions is represented by some universal language for items in goals
to be attained? Does
this mean also that any true (multi-lingual) lexicon for language terms is
represented by the
translation routines in brain stem / spinal cord from parallel deep
structure items into sequential
surface structure output strings; the choice for a certain output language,
and therefore the
specific translation routine, being then represented by some parameter
specified in the involved
awareness item? Does this explain the ease by which multi-linguals can
switch between languages
in the course of a discussion?
* Do the research results enable a confirmation / update / (partial)reject
to be made of the
modelling of human behavioral characteristics as expressed in chapter 6 and
in figures 33 and 37
in Walle (2000-1)? Can these judgments be formulated into the specification
of a more refined
research effort, aimed specifically at a final modelling of these human
behavioral characteristics,
both functionally and implementationally?
Other data are to be found in my website: www.novoware.tk
I look forward to your comments.
Regards,
Frans van der Walle
fw.novoware at planet.nl
Literature
Churchland, 1988 ; Patricia Smith Churchland; Neurophilosophy; toward a
unified science of the
mind-brain; 1988, A Bradford Book, MIT Press; Cambridge Massachusetts;
London, England;
ISBN-0-262-03116-7
Edelman, 1975; Gerald M Edelman; The remembered present; Basic books Inc.
publishers; New
York; ISBN 0-465-06910-X
Edelman,1989; Gerald M Edelman; Neural darwinism; the theory of neuronal
group selection;
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989; ISBN 0-19-286089-5
Edelman et al, 1979; Gerald M Edelman and Vernon B Mountcastle; 'The mindful
brain'; MIT
Mass., 1979; ISBN 0-262-05020-X
Freud, 1961; Sigmund Freud; 'Moses and Monotheism'; Vintage books; New-York;
1961
Freud, 1983; Sigmund Freud; "Abriss der Psychoanalyse"; Gesammelte Werke;
Schriften aus dem
Nachlasz; S Fischer Verlag; Frankfurt am Main; 1983. ISBN-3-10-022718-2;
pages 67 through
138.
Lawrence, 1992; Peter A Lawrence.; "The making of a fly"; Blackwell
Scientific Publications,
1992.
Litman, 1996; Gary W Litman; 'Sharks and the origin of vertebrate immunity';
Scientific
American, november 1996, pages 47-51.http://home.planet.nl/~novoware
McClelland et al,1987; James L McClelland and David E Rumelhart; 'Parallel
distributed
processing; explorations in the microstructure of cognition'; volume 2,
psychological and
biological models.
A Bradford book; MIT, 1987. ISBN 0-262-13218-4
McClelland, 1994; The organization of memory: a parallel distributing
processing perspective';
pages 570 through 579 in: Rev. Neurol. (Paris), 150, 8-9, 1994
McClelland et al,1995; James L McClelland, Bruce L McNaughton and Randall C
O'Reilly
Why there are complex learning systems in the hippocampus and neocortex:
Insights from the
successes and failures of connectionist models of learning and memory';
Psychological Review,
1995, vol. 102, no 3, pages 419 through 457.
Penfield et al., 1959; Wilder Penfield and Lamar Roberts; 'Speech and
brain-mechanisms'
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Yersey, 1959
Ridley, 1996; Mark Ridley; Evolution'; Blackwell Science Inc. 1996; ISBN
0-86542-495-0
Vygotsky, 1934/1986; Lev Vygotsky, Thought and language'; revised and
edited by Alex
Kozulin; MIT Press, 1986; ISBN 0-262-22029-6
Walle, 2000-1; Frans van der Walle; Biography of 'Man', a modelling of
human evolution, ISBN
90-804142-2-0, Novoware publishing company, Oss, the Netherlands, 2000;
email
fw.novoware at planet.nl; http://home.planet.nl/~novoware or:
http://www.novoware.tk.