We ask for a materialistic explanation of how the brain works based on the
neuron and the anatomy of the nervous system. We ask that the explanation
pay attention to those aspects of the nervous system that are reflected in
the subjective view of the brain as experienced by the soul (mind).
As a starting point we take the position that the soul (mind) has no causal
powers. The soul is completely extraneous to our explanation of brain
activity. The brain would act just as well with no soul present, but an
explanation of brain activity that ignores the soul will not satisfy many
people. We wish to say, "When these neurons are active, we have decided". We
have not decided, our brain has decided but we experience the active neurons
and say we did.
Our answer to the soul (mind)/body problem is that a material universe has
no need of soul. We leave that to the philosophers, they may worry it to
their heart's content. Our position for purposes of brain explanation is
that there is soul (mind) but it has no part to play in a material account
of brain action.
We direct our attention to the nervous system and, in particular, the
mammalian nervous system The brain is an artifact of anatomy, the nervous
system is the basic reality. We exempt from consideration those primitive
neural structures that lack interneurons. At the same time we insist that
all those neural structures that include interneurons are members of the
club, they differ only in complexity.
Why such an explanation? Because it is a common complaint of
neurophysiologists that no such overall explanation exists to serve as a
guide.
Since the very beginning, since 1955, AI has been bedeviled by the mind.
Anyone who put forward a design for an intelligent machine was asked, "Can
it think?" They said "think" but what they meant was, "Is there something
inside that machine that is aware?" In place of "mind" put the word "soul"
and we will have the raw question, does the machine have a soul? This
belongs strictly to religion. If this is what they mean, why don't they say
so? They don't because they are afraid of appearing soft on religion.
At the same time the philosophers are very self conscious about their lack
of technical knowledge. They know nothing of neuroscience, they know nothing
of computer engineering. But they are very confident (and rightly so) of
their ability to spin word castles in the air. So we have Turing's Test, so
we have Searle's Chinese Room.
As Turing originally posed his test, it was a simple engineering answer to
the philosophers. If you can't tell the machine from a human through a
teletype interface you might as well agree that it has a soul (mind). But
Turing's Test can be described with words and the philosophers have had a
field day with it.
Searle said, "You can't put a soul in the machine using syntax." (His
thought. my words) In another place he says, "A soul needs a carbon
substrate, it rejects a silicon substrate." (Again, his thought, my words)
Of course he didn't use the word "soul", he too is afraid of being accused
of being soft on religion.
We should leave soul (mind, self, intelligence, whatever) to the theologians
and proceed with the design of a machine that can think and decide using
only neuromimes. As a first step we examine the brain to see how the neurons
do these things. If we can explain the how the brain thinks, how it decides,
we shall know how to design the machine.
Ray
Those interested in how the brain works might look at
www.wsg.net/~rscanlon/brain.html