IUBio

Pribam quotes, please help

Cijadrachon cijadra at zedat.fu-berlin.de
Thu Jan 7 16:24:12 EST 1999


(To certain people: Skip start, end and maybe the rest, too.)

Felt like commenting that text:

>> "In the holographic state -- in the zone of frequencies -- maybe four
>> thousand years ago is tomorrow" 

And maybe not.

>In Pribram, K.H. "Languages of the Brain",
THE brain. Aha.

> "The essence of the holographic concept is that Images are reconstructed  when 
>representations in the form of distributed information systems 
>are appropriately engaged. These representations operate as filters or
>screens. 
How concrete. Now I can exactly imagine it.  ;-)
> In the brain correlation can take place at various levels. 
Actually the DOES I at times within magic find even more fascinating.
(Like the bit about the {to F.:gnagna...grin} "Funktionsumkoppelung")

>In more peripheral stations 
What a precise area naming.
>correlation occurs between successive configurations produced
>by receptor excitation :
(What I know about correlations of areas is more to do with magic
"fields" / energies.)
> the residuals left by adaptation through
>decrementing form a buffer memory register to be updated by current
>input. 
Which areas is this about precisely?

>At 
WHICH?
>more central stations correlation entails a more complex
>interaction : at any moment illput is correlated not only with the
>configuration of excitation existing at any locus,
> but also with
>patterns arriving from other statiolls.

(This is not by an autists I take it?
By some headblind, is it?

A little riddle row for the author and people of similar attitudes:
Why do some who are called autists 
...at times seem  like deaf when talked to and at other times not
when being talked to?
... all has to be in the same place?
... at times do not react to  injuring themselves like might be
expected of some others?)

> An example of this sort of
>complexity is shown in the experilllental results described in Chapter 7
>where the configuration of potelltial changes in the visual cortex was
>determined not only by the visual cues observed by a monkey, but also by
>the contingencies of reillforcement and the "intention" to make one or
>another response."

Here we are, after thousands of years of magic research, and have
texts like these. The monkey of course being generalized with all
others, and humans to be regarded ever so much apart, and the own I
areas of us mammals in limbic system as little worth mentioning as the
sequencer. I guess as the differences in folks like me are so minute,
that people knowing me well can perceive from the outside which CPU is
having eyes control, and are so minute that there are vast recording
differences to do with that, I guess a little more exact mentioning is
not necessary.

I keep finding it refreshing after thousands of years of brain energy
research and decades of neurology to read texts of such incredible
peripheral and central precision.

>"My hypothesis is that all thinking 
>bas,
?
> in addition to sign and  symbol
>manipulation, a holographic component.
That sentence made no meaning.

If the meaning was that the own thinking has to do with optics, for
all I know mine often does not. 

(To the opposite, when Frank wrote about something to do with
imagining a row of buildings one knows I kept straining for a while to
try that one and eventually got some blurry results (sufficient for
the game, though) of three houses in a row, then realized that the
middle one was no longer there and that I had forgotten what the new
one looks like, as it has just  been there next to my parents house
for some years, and that I also was not sure about the one following
where the windows were and could not entirely exclude a balcony.  And
then gave up. Before I tried if maybe there was another place with
three or four housies in a row, but did not get a result.)  

I recommend to the author to not bet his arse on his theory.

With the sign and symbol manipulation I did not get what he meant.

Guess some blind people might be interesting to ask about such stuff.


> Holographic representations are excellent associative mechanisms; 
>they powerfully and instantaneously perform cross-correlations. 
Aha.
>These are the very properties that have been attributed to thought 
Such "central station" vagueness is too hard for me to follow, I am
not used to summon the two main CPUs / the two thinkers of the brain
up like that.  
>in the problem solving process the difficulty bas been to make explicit 
>the neural mechanism involved. 
For that I do not know, but if the thinkers of the brain were to
interest me for serious, then, apart from contemplating that the CPUs
have many parts (delay), I guess I'd compare them more.

>Both this
>difficulty and the ubiquitous use by the brain of holographic
>transformations stem from another attribute :
Proof?
>holograms are composed by transformations which, when they are  simply
>repeated, essentially reconstruct the original from which the
>holographic representation was composed. Holograms are the "catalysts of
>thought." 
Just before in that theory THE brain was supposed to use them, now
they are supposed to have to do with the thinking areas.
At some point the author should make up his melon which areas he is
talking about.
Dropping hologram stuff and taking up area references might help when
talking about thoughts.

>Though they remain unchanged, they enter into and facilitate
>the thought process.
>... thought is a search through the distributed 
>holographic memory for resolution of uncertainty, i.e., for acquisition
>of relevant information. 
Error.
>This formulation is inadequate, 
Interesting way to call "plain wrong".

>however, unless the term relevan t infe)rmation includes appropriate configurations as
>well as items or bits in the information-theoretic sense.
Irxtlwrx is not going to cover for that.

But just for fun: What term, what relevan intormation, what
configuration; definition of appropriate, what  items, and what bits?

(And intentionally mistaken: Which sense is theoretical information?)

> More often than not, when problems generate thought' 
(lol)
>contextual and configurational
>matchings are sought' not just specific items of information. 

Sorry, I am in a pretty silly mood, and find it hilarious after
reading this stuff and wondering how someone could come up with that,
to arrive at "problems generating thought" in his brain. 

(And though I can't express it at the moment, some of the rest spices
it.)

>These matchings, 1 believe, can occur best while the coding operation is in
>its holographic mode. 
Expressed in systems (specific areas) and functions of  the brain that
is supposed to mean what?


>(...) Some of these
>distributions will, because of correlations with brain states different
>from the initial one, become imbedded in new representations. They thus
>become available, when properly triggered, as new possibilities in
>problem solving."

Is this text the solutions that come up with with that method?


Best I guess, first I and the sequencer do not think at all , then a
problem "generates thought", then comes some holostuff and then
repetions are sent out into memory systems in different stages and
then, when "properly triggered" the warped loads are available as
"solutions".

I could be stoned like a Globie in a hash-tent and likely'd not come
up with that much nonsense when out for seriously teaching someone
about brainstuff.

>Not that this makes much sense to me, 
Ach.

>nor might it help you very much.

Could be an entertaining game for some I suppose, as to say what is
wrong and how it is instead, you need to get quite far, sort of a
knowledge limit test game.
Also might be interesting if you read through the error load and then
read how he assumes how his thinking works and compare. 

To
>Dag Stenberg

What are you into in your work, what questions are you busy with and
roughly when is dusk and dawn in Helsinki now or at winter solstice?



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