IUBio

Toward a Science of Consciousness 1998

Gary Forbis forbis at accessone.com
Tue Apr 28 10:08:21 EST 1998


Jim Balter wrote:

> An implementation of a moon rover algorithm cannot rove the moon with
> only simulated inputs; it needs real transducers to do the real job.
> (Some people argue that, analogously, no implementation of an algorithm
> can be conscious without having real inputs, generally by studiously
> avoiding the quality that David Chalmers refers to as "organizational invariance" -- simulations of chess players play chess
> (organizationally invariant), whereas simulations of paper shredders
> don't shred paper (not organizationally invariant).)

I don't think the question is if being conscious is more like shredding paper or like playing chess.
I think the input needs to be real as does the device to which they are inputs.  The inputs needn't
be generated by way of eyes, ears, etc. but could be simulation of the same.  I'm not sure
how "organizational invarience" is maintained if it is not, that is how can I be said to have
the phenomenallogical experience of a chair unless there is some relationship between the inputs
as simulated and those I recieve from the chair naturally?  If you cut off my hands then you
have to stimulate the nerve bundle as if my hands were still there.  I think its organizational
invarience all the way down.

--
--gary
    forbis at accessone.com
    http://www.accessone.com/~forbis





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