In sci.physics meron at cars3.uchicago.edu wrote:
: >One problem I see is as follows: How do you know what's necessary?
: >
: In a most limited version you cauld say "if the theory fails to
: explain what we already know, then it doesn't have all that's
: necessery".
:And if some simpler theory predicts the same results, the previous one
becomes non-necessary. Though simplicity alone doesn't have much weight
in science. More usual is that the new theory predicts also some new
phenomena, which either is already known or it becomes necessity
to check.
: >Sure, we can think of trivial examples that look something like this:
: >X or X plus some untestable hypothesis. Obviously the former is
: >favored because the untestable hypothesis is unnecessary. But
: >what if you have two theories that come at the same phenomena
: >from completely different directions? Perhaps they both have
: >the same number of hypotheses, so the doctrine of "use only
: >what's necessary" isn't of any use.
: >
So in this situation there is no algorithmical way of deducing the
more necessary theory from the current phenomena alone.
: Indeed. Occam's razor isn't an infallible tool for picking the "True
: One" out of a bunch of competing theories. It is but a pragmatic
: decision making rule for the cases when a decision is needed. One
: should always bear in mind that "unless a decision is necessery, it is
: not necessery". In a case like the one you mention above, when two
: quite different but equally simple theories explain same phenomena
: equally well, The natural thing to do would be to pursue both
: directions and search for a possible hidden isomorphism or for
: something deeper underlying both.
:And it's not the two theories with different results that fight
viciously but the theories with the same results but different
backgrounds. So hopefully with more evidence we will move from the
situation where both theories are sufficient and neither of them
necessary to where one of them becomes necessary and the other
is no longer sufficient.
: >Other criteria would have to be introduced. For example, how
: >well do the theories fit with the rest of science?
: Consistency. Yes, very much so.
: >I would also think that a theory that can be generalized easier would
: >also be preferred.
: Yep. But that's usually not easy to judge.
These I think are naturally accomplished in the work of scientific
community. As the truth in this current(?) matter also.
So I support the old road of theory, i.e rumor control. In ancient
greece the first theorists were also turists. So if some disturbing
rumor broke out that had possible consequences for the state affairs,
a selected group of trustees were picked and sent to check the veracity.
After they came back with their conclusion it became the official truth
and after that to continue to spread rumors was punished with death.
--
So it shall be written - so it shall be done!
Soon there won't be any stars in the sky.
--
So it shall be written - so it shall be done!
Soon there won't be any stars in the sky.
