In article <01bccc08$1b3082e0$5324450c at default> Kim Kristensen,
Kjeldskov2 at worldnet.att.net writes:
>I disagree. There must be some well founded theories on the minimum
>condition to describe something as having mental processes.
>
Isn't it first necessary to define what we mean by "mental process"? In
silicon, a single AND gate, consisting of two transistors is sufficient
to process a certain mode of information. Plenty of people think that
mental processes are just a whole lot of these kinds of decisions, all
arranged in a certain way and connected to the outside world by all or
none sensory signals.
Being a reductionist, I can go along with this view to great extent,
after acknowledging that we don't really know much about the arrangement
or components that make up our own brains. But, presumably we are after
something a little more complicated than this. What is the "minimum" sort
of processing that you mean when you refer to a "mental process"?
Matt