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The cadacualtez of physical processes and the identity of events

Administrador del Nodo Postmaster at neubio.sld.ar
Sat Jan 27 22:10:57 EST 1996


Hello, netters,

               Thomas R. Gregg <greggt at copland.udel.edu>
posted a message on "Exact duplicate ..." referred to a
former subject "Brain and body" whose antecedent mailing
I missed.  Just as on natural-neuroscience themes, these
transcendent-neuroscience issues evince huge differences 
among the notional tools employed in the different coun-
tries to approach them.   Since one notorious profit of
these cheap international communications comes from con-
trasting perspectives (so as to avoid the positive rein-
forcement imposed by communicating inside a notional cir-
cle homogeneous in its grounding conceptual tools), let
me forward some short comments aimed centrally to illus-
trate the differences between the notional atmosphere in
which Gregg's analysis was set, and the work done outside
its circle.

1. I don't read Daniel Dennet's "Consciousness explained"
since I believe that such author moves inside an obsolete
circle of ideas regarding personal identity, a circle of
ideas connected with sociocultural matters foreign to the
present message but ever repeating the application of so-
me inadequate set of root metaphors derived from the Py-
thagorean-Parmenidean tradition. In particular, since they
believe that there is not science save of generalizations,
they are blind to cadacualtez concerns, that can not be
skipped when precisely attending personal identity problems.

2.  However, the main directions of the posted mail seems
to me cloven, rather than to the arguments (unknown to me)
of Prof. Dennet, to the disquisitions of the First Part of
Robert Nozick's "Philosophical Explanations" (Belknap Press
of Harvard Univ. Press, 1981) who, regarding what does mat-
ter (that is, the conceptual equipment) not either offer any
new notion to approach personal identity foreign to the men-
tioned PP tradition and its syncretic myth. Those arguments
had been criticized thoroughly here; of my hand, there are a-
vailable some divulgatory papers employed in the asignature
"Problems of personal identity" in our State Professorship in
Neuroscience, as the book "Como el tejido neurocognitivo ge-
nera fenomenos psicologicos" (Cat. Anat. y Fisiol. del Sist.
Nervioso, Univ. de Buenos Aires, 1984), and the Opposition Mo-
nograph of the 1986 concourse for the Chair of Philosophical
Problems in Psychology "Identidad personal como problema"
(Folia Neurobiologica Argentina VII, 413-531, 1989).

3. All this prevents qualifying the prefigurations of the
Pythagoric-Parmenidean tradition and its syncretic myth as
if they were "our Western, scientific way of thinking". For-
tunately, alternatives were explored and cultivated in the
worldwide plurality of traditions and are available to ad-
vance in the elucidation of these issues.

4. Nevertheless, in the European tradition they were the ve-
ry Pythagoreans who developed the quest for the unaware in-
tervals in consciousness (also thoroughly analyzed by non-
European schools). In this regard the best available synthe-
sis I know is Rodolfo Mondolfo's "La comprension del sujeto
humano en la cultura antigua" Part Two section IV (Iman, 
Buenos Aires, 1955; Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 1973). But this
subject cannot be approached without neither the mentioned
conceptual tools permitting apprehending cadacualtez concerns
(which in this List were previously mentioned by our Prof.
Mariela Szirko last year in posted messages on the subject
of our hylozoist stance, that can be retrieved from the Bio-
net server) nor without collating the neurophysiological
facts of the timing of integrative functions.

5. The unacceptable hodologies mentioned in the last para-
graph of Gregg's posting do presuppose that non-structural
one-witness physical facts are structural (and so can be
conveyed over all-transductionist neural networks)!! With
such unperceived contrafactuals is is impossible to discri-
minate even noema and noesis, and therefore it turns explai-
nable the setting of the personal identity inquiry on the
former instead that on the latter ("personal identity (or
sense of self-consciousness)". A good start to correct it
is studying Mondolfo's historical section, aforementioned.

      
       =@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@=@
       Prof. M.F. Crocco,
       <postmaster at neubio.sld.ar> 
                            
       Director, Centro de Investig. Neurobiologicas, Ministry of
Health & Welfare, Argentine Republic; and 
       Head, Lab. of Electroneurobiological Res., 
Hospital "Dr. Jose Tiburcio Borda", Municipality of Buenos Aires,
       Office:  Phone/Fax (54 1) 306 -7314
                e-mail <postmaster at neubio.gov.ar>
       Standard disclaimer: Las opiniones de este mensaje son
personales y no comprometen las dependencias a cargo del firmante
  Reply to THIS message,  ONLY to: <postmaster at neubio.sld.ar> 
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